Week 1 HW: Principles and Practices

1. Biological engineering application

Development of engineered bacterial systems capable of producing structural and functional materials in space, such as biopolymers, bio-composites, or mineralized matrices like in nasa experiment of BIO nutrient. These materials could be used for in-situ manufacturing of tools, radiation shielding, habitat components, or repair elements during long-duration space missions.

The motivation for this application is twofold. First, launching materials from Earth is extremely costly and mass-limited, creating strong incentives for in-situ resource utilization (ISRU). Second, biological systems offer self-replicating, adaptive, and low-energy manufacturing pathways, which are particularly attractive in constrained environments such as the Moon, Mars, or orbital stations.

This concept aligns with ongoing interests in synthetic biology for extreme environments and could build on existing microbial platforms already used to produce materials on Earth (e.g. bacterial cellulose, bioplastics, or biomineralization), adapted to microgravity, radiation, and limited nutrient conditions.

2. Governance and policy goals for an ethical future

To ensure that engineered bacteria for space material production contribute to an ethical and responsible future, several governance goals should be addressed, with a focus on non-malfeasance, safety, and environmental protection.

High-level governance goals

• Prevent biological harm to humans, ecosystems, and space environments
• Promote responsible and constructive use of synthetic biology in space
• Ensure accountability and transparency across research, deployment, and use

Specific sub-goals

• Containment and control: prevent unintended survival, evolution, or spread of engineered organisms beyond intended environments
• Biosecurity: reduce risks of misuse, dual-use exploitation, or accidental release
• Environmental protection: avoid contamination of extraterrestrial environments (planetary protection)
• Research integrity: allow scientific progress without excessive regulatory burden

3. Governance actions

Option 1: Mandatory biological containment and kill-switch standards

Purpose
Currently, containment strategies vary widely across labs and projects. I propose a mandatory baseline standard for biological containment, including genetic kill-switches and dependency on synthetic nutrients, for any engineered organism intended for space use.

Design

• Implemented by academic researchers and companies
• Standards defined by space agencies (e.g. NASA, ESA) in collaboration with bioethics boards
• Required for mission approval and funding eligibility

Assumptions

• Kill-switches remain reliable under space conditions
• Genetic safeguards cannot be easily bypassed by mutation

Risks of Failure & “Success”

• Failure: kill-switch malfunction could allow persistence or evolution
• Success risk: overconfidence in technical safeguards may reduce operational vigilance

Option 2: Incentivized open eporting and shared safety datasets

Purpose
Safety data from space-biology experiments are often fragmented or unpublished. This option proposes incentives for open reporting of failures, mutations, and unexpected behaviors in engineered organisms used for space applications.

Design

• Funding agencies require data sharing as a condition of grants
• Shared international databases curated by space agencies or consortia
• Participation incentivized rather than purely punitive

Assumptions

• Researchers and companies will report honestly if incentives are aligned
• Shared data improves collective risk assessment

Risks of Failure & “Success”

• Failure: underreporting due to reputational concerns
• Success risk: sensitive data could be misused if improperly accessed

Option 3: International licensing and mission-level oversight

Purpose
There is currently no unified international governance for deploying engineered organisms in space. This option proposes a mission-level licensing framework, analogous to satellite launch approvals or nuclear material oversight.

Design

• Led by international bodies (e.g. UN Office for Outer Space Affairs)
• Requires disclosure of organism function, safeguards, and risk assessments
• Involves national regulators and mission sponsors

Assumptions

• International cordination is achievable
• States are willing to cede limited autonomy for shared safety

Risks of Failure & “Success”

• Failure: regulatory delays or uneven enforcement across countries
• Success risk: excessive bureaucracy could slow beneficial research

4. Scoring governance actions against policy goals

(1 = best, 3 = weakest, n/a = not applicable)

5. Prioritization and recommenation

Based on this analysis, I would prioritize a combination of Option 1 (technical containment standards) and Option 2 (open safety reporting). Together, these approaches balance strong preventive safeguards with adaptive learning and transparency, while remaining feasible and relatively low-burden for researchers.

Option 3 provides important long-term value, especially for planetary protection and international trust, but its lower feasibility and higher risk of slowing innovation suggest it should be developed incrementally rather than as a prerequisite.

This recommendation is directed primaily toward space agencies and research funders, such as NASA, ESA, and international academic consortia. Key trade-offs considered include the tension between safety and innovation, and uncertainties around long-term organism behavior in space. These uncertainties reinforce the need for both robust technical controls and shared learning mechanisms rather than reliance on a single governance approach.